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CASE COMMENTS
states that abolish reverter and forfeiture even when the easements
and restrictions survive. The final paragraph of the statute declares
that the grantee of the tax deeds has the right to enforce like restrictions against "the immediate, mediate, or remote grantors" and
specifically excepts "forfeitures, right of re-entry or reverter" as means
of enforcement. 3 Although this exception seems unnecessary, inasmuch as the grantee would not normally have these rights, perhaps
the Legislature contemplated "forfeiture, right of re-entry and reverter" as means of enforcement. Since these measures were specifically
excluded from use by the grantee, it may be reasoned that their
omission as to the rights of the grantor indicates that the Legislature
intended for them to be among the means of enforcing the restrictions that survived the deed. Yet even after the passage of this statute
the Florida Court has stated that "a tax deed vests in the Grantee a
4
new, independent and paramount tide."2
Florida is now in the unusual position of being an "original title"
state where tax deeds extinguish prior liens, and yet restrictions and
covenants survive and may be enforced by reverter, right of re-entry,
and forfeiture.
GEa.LD SoHN

The following case comments, written by freshmen students in
fulfillment of a portion of the requirements in the course known as
Introduction to Legal Research and Writing, are considered of sufficient quality to merit publication.

EQUITY: INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FROM INTERFERENCE WITH
STATUTORY POLITICAL PARTY OFFICE
Shelly v. Brewer, 68 So.2d 573 (Fla. 1953)
Upon the zesignation of one Booth, respondent was elected chairman of a county executive committee of a political party. Petitioner,
the incumbent vice-chairman at the time of Booth's resignation,
claimed that she was entitled to the office and accordingly exercised the
23Ibid.
24Daniell v. Sherrill, 48 So.2d 736, 739 (Fla. 1950).
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powers of chairmanship. Respondent sought injunctive relief from
interference with his duties and, as provided by statute," a declaratory
decree as to his legal status. The circuit court denied a motion to dismiss
and granted a temporary injunction. On petition for certiorari, HEL.D,
pending determination of the officer's title a temporary injunction will
lie when there is an encroachment upon the statutory rights of a
political party officer. Certiorari denied.
It is generally recognized that, upon an encroachment of his duties,
a public officer may seek the aid of the courts. 2 Most jurisdictions hold
that a political party office does not come within the realm of public
office and therefore a party officer is not entitled to judicial relief
from encroachment upon his duties. 3 Florida, while not expressly
recognizing political party officers as public officers, has indicated that
they are at least analogous 4 and that both are entitled to any of the
processes of court in proper cases.5
The Florida Court has described the rights of political party officers
as legal rights,6 and has stated that quo warranto is the proper remedy
against the usurpation of authority of, or for trying the title to, a
statutory political office. 7 Prior to the instant case all decisions relating to political matters involved the extraordinary common law
writs.8 Equity refused to take jurisdiction when only political or
policyl matters were concerned; the presence of a property interest
was a prerequisite to equitable relief." There is a recent trend in other
American jurisdictions, however, toward relaxation of the rigid rule
'FLA. STAT. §§103.111, 103.121 (1953).
2

MECHEM, PUBLIC OFFICES AND OFICERS §478 (1st ed. 1890).

3E.g., Turk v. Cotton, 175 Ark. 100, 299 S.W. 613 (1927); People v. Brady, 302
Il1. 576, 135 N.E. 87 (1922); Attorney General v. Drohan, 169 Mass. 534, 48 N.E.
279 (1897); Heiskell v. Ledgerwood, 144 Tenn. 666, 234 S.W. 1001 (1921). Contra:
Dashigue v. Cohen, 14 La. App. 475, 131 So. 746 (1930).
4
See D'Alemberte v. State ex tel. Mays, 56 Fla. 162, 190, 47 So. 489, 498 (1908).
5See State ex rel. Merrill v. Gerow, 79 Fla. 804, 808, 85 So. 144, 146 (1920).
6
State ex tel. Merrill v. Gerow, 79 Fla. 804, 85 So. 144 (1920); D'Alemberte v.
State ex rel. Mays, 56 Fla. 162, 47 So. 489 (1908).
7State ex tel. Feltman v. Hughes, 49 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1950); State ex rel. Page v.
Dannelly, 139 Fla. 320, 190 So. 593 (1939); State ex tel. Watkins v. Fernandez, 106
Fla. 779, 143 So. 638 (1932); MEcHEm, op. cit. supra note 2, §478.
8E.g., D'Alemberte v. State ex tel. Mays, supra note 6; see note 7 supra.
9joughin v. Parks, 107 Fla. 833, 147 So. 273 (1932).
loAlexander v. Booth, 56 So.2d 716 (Fla. 1952).
liJoughin v. Parks, supra note 9; accord, Elder v. McCall, 350 Ill. 538, 183 N.E.
578 (1932); Fletcher v. Tuttle, 151 Il. 41, 37 N.E. 683 (1894); see Rhodes v. Driver,
69 Ark. 606, 611, 65 S.W. 106, 107 (1901).
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CASE COMMENTS
requiring that property rights be involved before equity will assume
jurisdiction. 12 Equity chancellors have come to realize that in a
society of increasing complexity there are many cases not involving
property rights in which relief at law either provides no remedy or is
so cumbersome as to be inadequate. With this realization in mind
the courts have granted temporary injunctions pending settlement
of title to office, utilizing such theories as the protection of public
welfare and legal rights. 3
In granting a temporary injunction in the instant case the Court
has affirmed earlier indications that a political party officer is a public
officer if he holds office under statutory provisions. Moreover, it has
indicated that when the legal right to a public office is disputed the
officeholder has a right to temporary injunctive relief in order to maintain the status quo.
Shelly v. Brewer is a landmark case in the Florida law relating
to political controversies; it has opened the door to equitable relief
by way of injunction as an adjunct to the use of declaratory judgments authorized by statute.' 4 It should not be concluded, however,
that the way has been cleared for any and all equitable relief. Only
temporary injunctive relief has been granted, and that as an adjunct
to another remedy; but it is not unreasonable to believe that other
forms of equitable relief will be made available in a proper case involving political rights. With the merger of law and equity in code
states, injunctions in those states may be available in some situations
without resort to declaratory judgment procedure. 15
The Florida Court, by this decision, has extended equitable relief beyond the protection of governmental functions immediately affecting the public. Today, pending settlement of title to his office,
a person holding any public office in Florida may seek temporary injunctive relief to prevent usurpation of his authority.
JOHN WOOrSLAIR SHEPPARD

12E.g., Thompson v. Talmadge, 201 Ga. 867, 41 S.E.2d 883 (1947); Richardson
v. Commonwealth, 275 Ky. 486, 122 S.W.2d 156 (1938); Heward v. Long, 178 S.C.
351, 183 S.E. 145 (1935); see DEFUNIAK, HANDBOOK Or MODERN EQurrY 171 (1950).

23 See e.g., Thompson v. Talmadge, supra note 12; Heward v. Long, supra note

12; Gilmore v. Waples, 108 Tex. 157, 188 S.W. 1037 (1916).
14FLA. STAT. c. 87 (1953). The existence of another remedy does not preclude
the use of declaratory judgment procedure, Lockleer v. West Palm Beach, 51 So.2d

291 (Fla. 1951).
15E.g., State v. Cunningham, 83 Wis. 90, 53 N.W. 35 (1892); see WALsH, A
TREATISE ON EQurrY

279 (1930).
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